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Does Interbank Borrowing Reduce Bank Risk?

  • VALERIYA DINGER
  • JÜRGEN VON HAGEN

In this paper we investigate whether banks that borrow from other banks have lower risk levels. We concentrate on a large sample of Central and Eastern European banks that allows us to explore the impact of interbank lending when exposures are long term and interbank borrowers are small banks. The results of the empirical analysis generally confirm the hypothesis that long-term interbank exposures result in lower risk of the borrowing banks. Copyright (c) 2009 The Ohio State University.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 41 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (03)
Pages: 491-506

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Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:41:y:2009:i:2-3:p:491-506
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