Does Interbank Borrowing Reduce Bank Risk?
In this paper we investigate whether banks that borrow from other banks have lower risk levels. We concentrate on a large sample of Central and Eastern European banks that allows us to explore the impact of interbank lending when exposures are long term and interbank borrowers are small banks. The results of the empirical analysis generally confirm the hypothesis that long-term interbank exposures result in lower risk of the borrowing banks. Copyright (c) 2009 The Ohio State University.
Volume (Year): 41 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (03)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Allen N. Berger, 1991. "Market discipline in banking," Proceedings 328, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Adam B. Ashcraft, 2006. "Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from the regulatory capital mix," Staff Reports 244, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Freixas, Xavier & Parigi, Bruno M & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2000.
"Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 611-38, August.
- Xavier Freixas & Bruno M. Parigi & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2000. "Systemic risk, interbank relations, and liquidity provision by the central bank," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 611-640.
- Freixas, Xavier & Parigi, Bruno & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1999. "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank," CEPR Discussion Papers 2325, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Xavier Freixas & Bruno Parigi & Jean Charles Rochet, 1998. "Systemic risk, interbank relations and liquidity provision by the Central Bank," Economics Working Papers 440, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Sep 1999.
- X. Freixas & B. Parigi & J-C. Rochet, 2000. "Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations and Liquidity Provision by theCentral Bank," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 47, Netherlands Central Bank.
- Sironi, Andrea, 2002. "Strengthening banks' market discipline and leveling the playing field: Are the two compatible?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 1065-1091, May.
- Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 1996.
"Interbank lending and systemic risk,"
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), pages 733-765.
- James A. Dorn, 2003. "Introduction," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 23(1), pages 1-9, Spring/Su.
- George Clarke & Robert Cull & Maria Soledad Martinez Peria & Susana M. S·nchez, 2003. "Foreign Bank Entry: Experience, Implications for Developing Economies, and Agenda for Further Research," World Bank Research Observer, World Bank Group, vol. 18(1), pages 25-59.
- Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, 1998. "Financial Contagion Journal of Political Economy," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 98-31, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Brenda GonzÃ¡lez-Hermosillo, 1996. "Banking Sector Fragility and Systemic Sources of Fragility," IMF Working Papers 96/12, International Monetary Fund.
- Allen N. Berger & Nathan H. Miller & Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, 2002.
"Does Function Follow Organzizational Form? Evidence From the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1976, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Berger, Allen N. & Miller, Nathan H. & Petersen, Mitchell A. & Rajan, Raghuram G. & Stein, Jeremy C., 2005. "Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 237-269, May.
- Allen N. Berger & Nathan H. Miller & Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence From the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks," NBER Working Papers 8752, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Allen N. Berger & Nathan H. Miller & Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuran G. Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Does function follow organizational form? evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks," Proceedings 815, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Douglas Evanoff & Larry Wall, 2001.
"Sub-debt Yield Spreads as Bank Risk Measures,"
Journal of Financial Services Research,
Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 121-145, October.
- Nikolay Nenovsky & Kalina Dimitrova, 2003. "Deposit Insurance During EU Accession," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-617, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Valeriya Dinger & Jürgen von Hagen, 2011. "The Competitive Advantage of Incumbents: Evidence from Newly Liberalized Banking Industries," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(4), pages 578-607, December.
- Adam Ashcraft & Hoyt Bleakley, 2006. "On the market discipline of informationally opaque firms: evidence from bank borrowers in the federal funds market," Staff Reports 257, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Furfine, Craig H, 2001. "Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence from the Overnight Federal Funds Market," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(1), pages 33-57, January.
- Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 1997. "Microeconomics of Banking," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061937, June.
- Billett, Matthew T & Garfinkel, Jon A, 2004. "Financial Flexibility and the Cost of External Finance for U.S. Bank Holding Companies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(5), pages 827-52, October.
- Donald Morgan & Kevin Stiroh, 2001. "Market Discipline of Banks: The Asset Test," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 195-208, October.
- Billett, Matthew T. & Garfinkel, Jon A. & O'Neal, Edward S., 1998. "The cost of market versus regulatory discipline in banking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 333-358, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:41:y:2009:i:2-3:p:491-506. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.