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A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand

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  • Yao, Zhiyong
  • Xiao, Zhiguo

Abstract

Within the independent private value paradigm, this note first analyzes two-round sequential first-price auctions with multi-unit demand. We show that the expected price in the first round is strictly lower than that in the second round due to the “extraction effect”. We then compare the revenues for the sequential auctions and the simultaneous auctions. We show that the discriminatory auction, the Vickrey auction, and the sequential second-price auctions generate the same revenue for the seller, followed in order by the sequential first-price auctions, and by the uniform-price auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Yao, Zhiyong & Xiao, Zhiguo, 2013. "A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 276-281.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:66:y:2013:i:3:p:276-281
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.06.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Helmuts Āzacis, 2020. "Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 411-444, June.

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