Epistemic considerations of decision making in games
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- LISMONT, Luc & MONGIN, Philippe, 1994.
"On the Logic of Common Belief and Common Knowledge,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1994005, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Lismont, L. & Mongin, P., . "On the logic of common belief and common knowledge," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1104, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Robert Aumann & Adam Brandenburger, 2014.
"Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,
in: The Language of Game Theory Putting Epistemics into the Mathematics of Games, chapter 5, pages 113-136
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Kaneko, Mamoru & Nagashima, Takashi, 1991. "Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 229-255, December.
- Kats, Amoz & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1992.
"Unilaterally Competitive Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(3), pages 291-99.
- Johansen, Leif, 1982. " On the Status of the Nash Type of Noncooperative Equilibrium in Economic Theory," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 84(3), pages 421-41.
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