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Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information

Author

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  • Giacomo Bonanno
  • Klaus Nehring

Abstract

Within an incomplete information framework (where the primitives are the individuals' belief hierarchies) we investigate the intersubjective implications of the assumption that it is common belief that no individual has any false beliefs (a key component of the Truth Axiom). We consider two types of intersubjective conditions: (1) qualitative agreement and unbounded gains from betting, and (2) a notion of intersubjective caution. The entire analysis is carried out locally.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information," Department of Economics 97-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:caldec:97-03
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    File URL: http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/working_papers/97-3.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Satoshi Fukuda, 2024. "On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 78(2), pages 521-565, September.
    2. Samet, Dov, 2013. "Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 192-200.
    3. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Department of Economics 98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    4. Tarbush, Bassel, 2011. "Generalisation of Samet's (2010) agreement theorem," MPRA Paper 29067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Michael Trost, 2013. "Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 755-776, August.
    6. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Department of Economics 98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    7. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey," Department of Economics 97-18, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    8. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 9, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    9. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
    10. Fukuda, Satoshi, 2024. "On the axiomatization of an unawareness structure from knowing-whether operators," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    11. Bonanno, Giacomo & Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 17-36, January.
    12. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Introduction To The Semantics Of Belief And Common Belief," Department of Economics 97-19, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    13. Tarbush, Bassel, 2011. "Agreeing to disagree with generalised decision functions," MPRA Paper 29066, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 1111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    15. Cyril Hédoin, 2016. "Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-17, November.
    16. Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents," Economics Working Papers 0035, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    17. Jean-Marc Tallon & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Shmuel Zamir, 2003. "Contradicting Beliefs and Communication," Discussion Paper Series dp311, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

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