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Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information

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  • Giacomo Bonanno
  • Klaus Nehring

    (Department of Economics, University of California Davis)

Abstract

Within an incomplete information framework (where the primitives are the individuals'' belief hierarchies) we investigate the intersubjective implications of the assumption that it is common belief that no individual has any false beliefs (a key component of the Truth Axiom). We consider two types of intersubjective conditions: (1) qualitative agreement and unbounded gains from betting, and (2) a notion of intersubjective caution. The entire analysis is carried out locally.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Assessing The Truth Axiom Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 116, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cda:wpaper:116
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    Cited by:

    1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
    2. Bonanno, Giacomo & Nehring, Klaus, 1998. "On the logic and role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 17-36, January.
    3. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 9, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    4. Samet, Dov, 2013. "Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 192-200.
    5. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Department of Economics 98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    6. Tarbush, Bassel, 2011. "Generalisation of Samet's (2010) agreement theorem," MPRA Paper 29067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Introduction To The Semantics Of Belief And Common Belief," Department of Economics 97-19, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    8. Tarbush, Bassel, 2011. "Agreeing to disagree with generalised decision functions," MPRA Paper 29066, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 1111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    10. Cyril Hédoin, 2016. "Community-Based Reasoning in Games: Salience, Rule-Following, and Counterfactuals," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-17, November.
    11. Michael Trost, 2013. "Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 755-776, August.
    12. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Department of Economics 98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    13. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey," Department of Economics 97-18, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    14. Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents," Economics Working Papers 0035, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    15. Jean-Marc Tallon & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Shmuel Zamir, 2003. "Contradicting Beliefs and Communication," Discussion Paper Series dp311, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

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