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Connecting Mediterranean countries through electricity corridors: New Institutional Economic and regulatory analysis

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  • Khalfallah, Haikel

Abstract

A super grid connecting the two shores of the Mediterranean could help Europe meet its targets for integrating renewable energy. This paper assesses the business models for building a platform for wholesale renewable energy trade via electricity corridors linking the two regions of the Mediterranean basin. We demonstrate that the optimal framework for designing the corridor project is a long-term contractual agreement to coordinate bilaterally the necessary investments. Furthermore a hybrid governance structure requiring only limited regulatory adaptation seems to be the most efficient structure for facilitating investment in the corridor's infrastructure.

Suggested Citation

  • Khalfallah, Haikel, 2015. "Connecting Mediterranean countries through electricity corridors: New Institutional Economic and regulatory analysis," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 45-54.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:32:y:2015:i:c:p:45-54
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2015.01.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Jebali, Eya & Essid, Hédi & Khraief, Naceur, 2017. "The analysis of energy efficiency of the Mediterranean countries: A two-stage double bootstrap DEA approach," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 991-1000.
    2. Engelken, Maximilian & Römer, Benedikt & Drescher, Marcus & Welpe, Isabell M. & Picot, Arnold, 2016. "Comparing drivers, barriers, and opportunities of business models for renewable energies: A review," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 795-809.
    3. Francesca Pia Vantaggiato, 2020. "Networks as First Best? Network Entrepreneurship and Venue Shifting in the Establishment of the Network of Euro–Mediterranean Energy Regulators," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(3), pages 654-671, May.
    4. Guler, Burak & Çelebi, Emre & Nathwani, Jatin, 2018. "A ‘Regional Energy Hub’ for achieving a low-carbon energy transition," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 376-385.
    5. Poudineh, Rahmatallah & Rubino, Alessandro, 2017. "Business model for cross-border interconnections in the Mediterranean basin," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 96-108.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    New Institutional Economics; Renewable energy sources; Regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • Q27 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Issues in International Trade

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