Human resource constraints for electricity regulation in developing countries: Developments since 2001
We provide strong evidence that there are significant human resource constraints which limit the scale and, hence, the scope and potential effectiveness of electricity/energy regulatory agencies in developing countries. We summarise the key findings in our earlier Domah, Pollitt and Stern paper (2002). We then consider what new evidence there is on regulatory staffing levels since 2001/2002 and on the implications of high fixed costs for developing countries' electricity and regulatory policies. Our conclusion is that little has changed over the intervening period.
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