Power and deception in ultimatum bargaining
In two experiments we investigated the relation between power and deception in ultimatum bargaining. Results showed that recipients of an ultimatum used deception to obtain better offers and that more recipients did so in a low power position. Further analyses showed that the recipient's use of deception was mediated by concerns about receiving a low offer. For allocators, being in a low power position did not increase the use of deception. Instead, allocators increased their offer when they were in a low power position. The results are discussed in terms of an instrumental approach to deception. This approach incorporates the notion that bargainers (a) will use deception as a means to reach their goals in bargaining but (b) may refrain from using deception when they have alternative means to reach their goals.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 115 (2011)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdp|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gregory Dees, J. & Cramton, Peter C., 1991.
"Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality In Practice,"
Business Ethics Quarterly,
Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(02), pages 135-167, April.
- Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, 1991. "Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality in Pratice," Papers of Peter Cramton 91beq, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Boles, Terry L. & Croson, Rachel T. A. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 2000. "Deception and Retribution in Repeated Ultimatum Bargaining," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 235-259, November.
- Koning, Lukas & Dijk, Eric van & Beest, Ilja van & Steinel, Wolfgang, 2010. "An Instrumental Account of Deception and Reactions to Deceit in Bargaining," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(01), pages 57-73, January.
- Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
- Kravitz, David A. & Gunto, Samuel, 1992. "Decisions and perceptions of recipients in ultimatum bargaining games," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 65-84.
- Strudler, Alan, 1995. "On the Ethics of Deception in Negotiation," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(04), pages 805-822, October.
- Steinel, Wolfgang & Utz, Sonja & Koning, Lukas, 2010. "The good, the bad and the ugly thing to do when sharing information: Revealing, concealing and lying depend on social motivation, distribution and importance of information," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 85-96, November.
- Roth, Alvin E & Murnighan, J Keith, 1982. "The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1123-1142, September.
- Alvin E Roth & J K Murnighan, 1997. "The rule of information in bargaining: an experimental study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1631, David K. Levine.
- Blount, Sally, 1995. "When Social Outcomes Aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preferences," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 131-144, August.
- Fellner, Gerlinde & Guth, Werner, 2003. "What limits escalation?--Varying threat power in an ultimatum experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 53-60, July.
- Straub, Paul G. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 1995. "An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 345-364, August.
- Suleiman, Ramzi, 1996. "Expectations and fairness in a modified Ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 531-554, November.
- Kagel, John H. & Kim, Chung & Moser, Donald, 1996. "Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 100-110, March.
- Samuel B. Bacharach & Edward J. Lawler, 1981. "Power and Tactics in Bargaining," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 34(2), pages 219-233, January.
- Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
- Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, 1995. "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-219, Spring. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)