Designing domestic institutions for international monetary policy cooperation: A Utopia?
In a wide variety of international macroeconomic models monetary policy cooperation is optimal, non-cooperative policies are inefficient, but optimal policies can be attained non-cooperatively by optimal design of domestic institutions/contracts. We show that given endogenous institutional design, inefficiencies of non-cooperation cannot and will not be eliminated. We model the delegation stage explicitly and show that subgame perfect, credible contracts (chosen by governments based on individual rationality) are non-zero, but are different from optimal contracts and hence lead to inefficient equilibria. Optimal contracts require cooperation at the delegation stage, which is inconsistent with the advocated non-cooperative nature of the solution. A general solution method for credible contracts and an example from international monetary policy cooperation are considered. Our results feature delegation as an equilibrium phenomenon, explain inefficiencies of existing delegation schemes and hint to a potentially stronger role for supranational authorities in international policy coordination.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L & Kalai, Ehud, 1991.
"Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 551-59, August.
- Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L. Judd & Ehud Kalai, 1990. "Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation," Discussion Papers 879, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995.
"Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-edged incentives: Institutions and policy coordination," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 1973-2030 Elsevier.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996.
"Monetary Cohabitation in Europe,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 111-16, May.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, . "Monetary Cohabitation in Europe," Working Papers 96, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1996. "Monetary Cohabitation in Europe," NBER Working Papers 5532, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Monetary Cohabitation in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 1380, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Matthew B. Canzoneri & Dale W. Henderson, 1991. "Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies: A Game-Theoretic Approach," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031787, June.
- Avinash Dixit & Henrik Jensen, 2003. "Common Agency with Rational Expectations: Theory and Application to a Monetary Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 539-549, 07.
- Canzoneri, Matthew B & Gray, Jo Anna, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Consequences of Non-cooperative Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 547-64, October.
- Benigno, Pierpaolo, 2002. "A simple approach to international monetary policy coordination," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 177-196, June.
- Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August.
- Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti, 1997.
"Welfare and Macroeconomic Interdependence,"
NBER Working Papers
6307, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- McCallum, Bennett T, 1995.
"Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-11, May.
- Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jensen, Henrik, 2000. "Optimal monetary policy cooperation through state-independent contracts with targets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 517-539, March.
- Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 1996. "Foundations of International Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262150476, June.
- Kohler, Marion, 2002.
"Coalition formation in international monetary policy games,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 371-385, March.
- Marion Kohler, 1999. "Coalition formation in international monetary policy games," Bank of England working papers 92, Bank of England.
- Hamada, Koichi, 1976. "A Strategic Analysis of Monetary Interdependence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(4), pages 677-700, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:30:y:2011:i:3:p:393-409. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.