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The economics of regulatory mandates on the HMO market

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  • Encinosa, William

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  • Encinosa, William, 2001. "The economics of regulatory mandates on the HMO market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 85-107, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:20:y:2001:i:1:p:85-107
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Given, Ruth S., 1996. "Economies of scale and scope as an explanation of merger and output diversification activities in the health maintenance organization industry," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 685-713, December.
    2. Leland, Hayne E, 1979. "Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1328-1346, December.
    3. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    4. Wholey, Douglas & Feldman, Roger & Christianson, Jon B. & Engberg, John, 1996. "Scale and scope economies among health maintenance organizations," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(6), pages 657-684, December.
    5. Uri Ronnen, 1991. "Minimum Quality Standards, Fixed Costs, and Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 490-504, Winter.
    6. Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 177-183, May.
    7. Neudeck, Werner & Podczeck, Konrad, 1996. "Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 387-408, August.
    8. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Gries & Dirk Langeleh, 2004. "Anreizkompatibilität als zentrales Element eines neu gestalteten Gesundheitsmarktes," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(3), pages 293-311, August.
    2. Virender Kumar & Edward Norton & William Encinosa, 2006. "OBRA 1987 and the quality of nursing home care," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 49-81, March.
    3. Olivella, Pau & Vera-Hernandez, Marcos, 2007. "Competition among differentiated health plans under adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 233-250, March.
    4. Burkey, Mark L., 2008. ""Selling the store" to the HMO: A life insurance contract for optimal provision of care," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 118-132, January.
    5. Canuto, Otaviano & Alexandre, Michel & Lima, Gilberto Tadeu, 2003. "Investimentos externos em serviços e efeitos potenciais da negociação da ALCA," Estudios y Perspectivas – Oficina de la CEPAL en Brasilia 4831, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    6. Glazer, Jacob & McGuire, Thomas G., 2011. "Gold and Silver health plans: Accommodating demand heterogeneity in managed competition," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 1011-1019.

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