IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jfinec/v105y2012i1p153-173.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Predicting fraud by investment managers

Author

Listed:
  • Dimmock, Stephen G.
  • Gerken, William C.

Abstract

We test the predictability of investment fraud using a panel of mandatory disclosures filed with the SEC. We find that disclosures related to past regulatory and legal violations, conflicts of interest, and monitoring have significant power to predict fraud. Avoiding the 5% of firms with the highest ex ante predicted fraud risk would allow an investor to avoid 29% of fraud cases and over 40% of the total dollar losses from fraud. We find no evidence that investors receive compensation for fraud risk through superior performance or lower fees. We examine the barriers to implementing fraud prediction models and suggest changes to the SEC's data access policies that could benefit investors.

Suggested Citation

  • Dimmock, Stephen G. & Gerken, William C., 2012. "Predicting fraud by investment managers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 153-173.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:105:y:2012:i:1:p:153-173
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.01.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X12000037
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.01.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Stephen Brown & William Goetzmann & Bing Liang & Christopher Schwarz, 2008. "Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(6), pages 2785-2815, December.
    3. Patricia M. Dechow & Richard G. Sloan & Amy P. Sweeney, 1996. "Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 1-36, March.
    4. Eric Zitzewitz, 2006. "How Widespread Was Late Trading in Mutual Funds?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 284-289, May.
    5. Murphy, Deborah L. & Shrieves, Ronald E. & Tibbs, Samuel L., 2009. "Understanding the Penalties Associated with Corporate Misconduct: An Empirical Examination of Earnings and Risk," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(1), pages 55-83, February.
    6. Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr, 1993. "The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 757-802, October.
    7. Stephen Brown & William Goetzmann & Bing Liang & Christopher Schwarz, 2008. "Estimating Operational Risk for Hedge Funds: The ?-Score," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2559, Yale School of Management, revised 11 Sep 2009.
    8. Nicolas P.B. Bollen & Veronika K. Pool, 2009. "Do Hedge Fund Managers Misreport Returns? Evidence from the Pooled Distribution," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 2257-2288, October.
    9. Whitney Newey & Kenneth West, 2014. "A simple, positive semi-definite, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 33(1), pages 125-132.
    10. Patricia M. Dechow & Weili Ge & Chad R. Larson & Richard G. Sloan, 2011. "Predicting Material Accounting Misstatements," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(1), pages 17-82, March.
    11. Bollen, Nicolas P. B. & Pool, Veronika K., 2008. "Conditional Return Smoothing in the Hedge Fund Industry," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(2), pages 267-298, June.
    12. Jeffrey A. Busse & Amit Goyal & Sunil Wahal, 2010. "Performance and Persistence in Institutional Investment Management," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(2), pages 765-790, April.
    13. Carhart, Mark M, 1997. "On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 57-82, March.
    14. Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr & Wehrly, Eric W, 2005. "The Reputational Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(2), pages 653-675, October.
    15. Ajay Khorana & Henri Servaes & Peter Tufano, 2009. "Mutual Fund Fees Around the World," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(3), pages 1279-1310.
    16. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    17. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
    18. Fung, William & Hsieh, David A, 2001. "The Risk in Hedge Fund Strategies: Theory and Evidence from Trend Followers," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 14(2), pages 313-341.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dan Amiram & Zahn Bozanic & James D. Cox & Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff & Richard Sloan, 2018. "Financial reporting fraud and other forms of misconduct: a multidisciplinary review of the literature," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 732-783, June.
    2. Quentin Dupont & Jonathan M. Karpoff, 2020. "The Trust Triangle: Laws, Reputation, and Culture in Empirical Finance Research," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 163(2), pages 217-238, May.
    3. Bali, Turan G. & Brown, Stephen J. & Caglayan, Mustafa O., 2019. "Upside potential of hedge funds as a predictor of future performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 212-229.
    4. Brown, Stephen & Goetzmann, William & Liang, Bing & Schwarz, Christopher, 2012. "Trust and delegation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 221-234.
    5. Edward M. Iacobucci, 2014. "On the Interaction between Legal and Reputational Sanctions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 189-207.
    6. Samuel L. Tibbs & Deborah L. Harrell & Ronald E. Shrieves, 2011. "Do Shareholders Benefit from Corporate Misconduct? A Long‐Run Analysis," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 8(3), pages 449-476, September.
    7. Andrew W. Lo & Mila Getmansky & Peter A. Lee, 2015. "Hedge Funds: A Dynamic Industry in Transition," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 483-577, December.
    8. Rind, Asad Ali & Abbassi, Wajih & Allaya, Manel & Hammouda, Amira, 2022. "Local peers and firm misconduct: The role of sustainability and competition," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    9. Akhtar, Shumi & Akhtar, Farida & John, Kose & Wong, Su-Wen, 2019. "Multinationals' tax evasion: A financial and governance perspective," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 35-62.
    10. Chao Fu & Xiuyuan Deng & Hongfei Tang, 2023. "Who cares about corporate fraud? Evidence from cross-border mergers and acquisitions of Chinese companies," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 747-789, February.
    11. Juha Joenväärä & Robert Kosowski, 2021. "The Effect of Regulatory Constraints on Fund Performance: New Evidence from UCITS Hedge Funds [Large sample properties of matching estimators for average treatment effects]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 25(1), pages 189-233.
    12. Arpit Gupta & Kunal Sachdeva, 2025. "Skin or Skim? Inside Investment and Hedge Fund Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(4), pages 3357-3383, April.
    13. Cline, Brandon N. & Walkling, Ralph A. & Yore, Adam S., 2018. "The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex, lies, and firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 389-415.
    14. Agarwal, Vikas & Green, T. Clifton & Ren, Honglin, 2018. "Alpha or beta in the eye of the beholder: What drives hedge fund flows?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(3), pages 417-434.
    15. Laure de Batz & Evžen Kočenda, 2024. "Financial crime and punishment: A meta‐analysis," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(4), pages 1338-1398, September.
    16. Kosowski, Robert & Joenväärä, Juha & Kaupila, Mikko & Tolonen, Pekka, 2019. "Hedge Fund Performance: Are Stylized Facts Sensitive to Which Database One Uses?," CEPR Discussion Papers 13618, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Paolo Polidori & Désirée Teobaldelli, 2018. "Corporate criminal liability and optimal firm behavior: internal monitoring versus managerial incentives," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 251-284, April.
    18. Brown, Stephen & Goetzmann, William & Liang, Bing & Schwarz, Christopher, 2012. "Trust and delegation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 221-234.
    19. Armour, John & Mayer, Colin & Polo, Andrea, 2017. "Regulatory Sanctions and Reputational Damage in Financial Markets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(4), pages 1429-1448, August.
    20. Peter-Jan Engelen, 2011. "Legal versus Reputational Penalties in Deterring Corporate Misconduct," Chapters, in: Mehmet Ugur & David Sunderland (ed.), Does Economic Governance Matter?, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fraud; Investment fraud; Operational risk; SEC; Disclosure; Form ADV;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:105:y:2012:i:1:p:153-173. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.