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Dynamic persuasion

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  • Honryo, Takakazu

Abstract

This paper constructs a model of dynamic persuasion. A sender attempts to persuade a decision maker (DM) by sequentially revealing verifiable arguments, but this incurs communication costs. In equilibrium, the sender decides when to give up, and the DM decides when to make a decision. We characterize the DM-optimal equilibrium. We further show that the DM gains from making a stochastic commitment, and provide a condition under which it also makes the sender better-off.

Suggested Citation

  • Honryo, Takakazu, 2018. "Dynamic persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 36-58.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:178:y:2018:i:c:p:36-58
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.08.007
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    Cited by:

    1. Aradhye, Aditya & Flesch, János & Staudigl, Mathias & Vermeulen, Dries, 2023. "Incentive compatibility in sender-receiver stopping games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 303-320.
    2. Ehud Lehrer & Dimitry Shaiderman, 2021. "Markovian Persuasion," Papers 2111.14365, arXiv.org.
    3. Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2021. "Can a better informed listener be easier to persuade?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 705-721, October.
    4. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    5. Deepanshu Vasal, 2020. "Dynamic information design," Papers 2005.07267, arXiv.org.
    6. Zeinab Aboutalebi & Ayush Pant, 2021. "Believe ... and you are there. On Self-Confidence and Feedback," Working Papers 64, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Communication; Persuasion; Dynamics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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