Entry Deterrence and Signaling in a Nonrenewable Resource Model
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Charles Mason & Stephen Polasky, 2002. "Strategic Preemption in a Common Property Resource: A Continuous Time Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(3), pages 255-278, November.
- Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2013.
"Asymmetric information may protect the commons: The welfare benefits of uninformed regulators,"
Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 463-467.
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, "undated". "Asymmetric Information may Protect the Commons: The Welfare Benefits of Uniformed Regulators," Working Papers 2013-8, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
- Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2011.
"Can incomplete information lead to under-exploitation in the commons?,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 402-413.
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2010. "Can Incomplete Information Lead to Under-exploitation in the Commons," Working Papers 2010-04, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, "undated". "Entry Deterrence in the Commons with Multiple Incumbents," Working Papers 2012-1, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
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