Asymmetric information may protect the commons: The welfare benefits of uninformed regulators
We examine an entry-deterrence model in the commons. We investigate in which contexts asymmetric information among firms becomes welfare improving, and in which settings an uninformed regulator may prefer to assess and disseminate information about the available stock among firms.
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- Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2010. "Can Incomplete Information Lead to Under-exploitation in the Commons," Working Papers 2010-04, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
- Polasky, Stephen & Bin, Okmyung, 2001. "Entry Deterrence and Signaling in a Nonrenewable Resource Model," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 235-256, November.
- Nicolas Faysse, 2005. "Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 239-261, 04.
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