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Do cultures clash? Evidence from cross-national ultimatum game experiments

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Listed author(s):
  • Chuah, Swee-Hoon
  • Hoffmann, Robert
  • Jones, Martin
  • Williams, Geoffrey

Abstract

Economic, political and social globalisation entails increasing interaction between individuals of different cultures. While experimental economists have established differences between the behaviour within different cultures, the effect of cultural difference on cross-culture interactions has so far not been sufficiently explored. This paper reports on the results of experiments with ultimatum games designed for this purpose, in which Malaysian Chinese and UK subjects played opponents of their own as well as of the other culture. We find that cultural differences exist between the behaviour of Western and Asians interacting (a) within their own respective national groups, and (b) with members of the other group. This evidence is discussed in terms of the possibility of a 'clash of cultures'.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 64 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 35-48

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:64:y:2007:i:1:p:35-48
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
  • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
  • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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