Sharing of endogenous risk in construction
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Sanford J Grossman & Oliver D Hart, 2001.
"An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
391749000000000339, David K. Levine.
- Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 15-80, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001.
"Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
- Patrick Bajari & Steven Tadelis, 1999. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," Working Papers 99029, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Osmundsen, Petter, 1999. "Risk sharing and incentives in norwegian petroleum extraction," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(9), pages 549-555, September.
- Emhjellen, Kjetil & Emhjellen, Magne & Osmundsen, Petter, 2002. "Investment cost estimates and investment decisions," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 91-96, January.
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