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Professionals and students in a lobbying experiment: Professional rules of conduct and subject surrogacy

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  • Potters, Jan
  • van Winden, Frans

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  • Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 2000. "Professionals and students in a lobbying experiment: Professional rules of conduct and subject surrogacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 499-522, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:43:y:2000:i:4:p:499-522
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chan, Kenneth S. & Mestelman, Stuart & Muller, R. Andrew, 2008. "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
    2. Anderson, Matthew J. & Sunder, Shyam, 1995. "Professional Traders as Intuitive Bayesians," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 185-202, November.
    3. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1996. "Comparative Statics of a Signaling Game: An Experimental Study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(3), pages 329-353.
    4. Dyer, Douglas & Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1989. "A Comparison of Naive and Experienced Bidders in Common Value Offer Auctions: A Laboratory Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 108-115, March.
    5. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-1095, December.
    6. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Evolution, learning, and economic behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-24, February.
    7. Stuart Mestelman & David Feeny, 1988. "Does ideology matter?: Anecdotal experimental evidence on the voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 281-286, June.
    8. repec:feb:framed:00135 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Douglas Dyer & John H. Kagel, 1996. "Bidding in Common Value Auctions: How the Commercial Construction Industry Corrects for the Winner's Curse," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 42(10), pages 1463-1475, October.
    10. Dejong, Douglas V. & Forsythe, Robert & Uecker, Wilfred C., 1988. "A note on the use of businessmen as subjects in sealed offer markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 87-100, January.
    11. Kagel, John H & Roth, Alvin E, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1379-1391, December.
    12. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
    13. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-661, May.
    14. Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1485-1527, December.
    15. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-292, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Cooper, 2006. "Are experienced managers experts at overcoming coordination failure?," Artefactual Field Experiments 00037, The Field Experiments Website.
    2. Beck, Adrian & Kerschbamer, Rudolf & Qiu, Jianying & Sutter, Matthias, 2014. "Car mechanics in the lab––Investigating the behavior of real experts on experimental markets for credence goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 166-173.
    3. Hopfensitz, Astrid & Wranik, Tanja, 2009. "How to Adapt to Changing Markets: Experience and Personality in a Repeated Investment Game," TSE Working Papers 09-122, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. Großer, Jens & Reuben, Ernesto, 2013. "Redistribution and market efficiency: An experimental study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 39-52.
    5. Massimo Castro, 2006. "Cultural goods and laboratory experiments," International Review on Public and Nonprofit Marketing, Springer;International Association of Public and Non-Profit Marketing, pages 67-79.
    6. Vetter, Stefan, 2012. "Delegation and Rewards," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 378, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    7. John M. Spraggon & Robert J. Oxoby, 2009. "Game Theory For Playing Games: Sophistication In A Negative-Externality Experiment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 47(3), pages 467-481, July.
    8. Goodwin, Paul, 2002. "Forecasting games: can game theory win?," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 369-374.
    9. Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006. "Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(2), pages 103-121, June.
    10. Mariya Teteryatnikova & James Tremewan, 2016. "An offer you can refuse: the effects of transparency with endogenous conflict of interest," Vienna Economics Papers 1602, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    11. Enrique Fatas & Tibor Neugebauer & Pilar Tamborero, 2007. "How Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experiment," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 92(2), pages 167-196, October.
    12. Ahn, T.K. & Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James, 2011. "Reprint of: A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(9), pages 1580-1589, July.
    13. Vetter, Stefan, 2013. "Delegating decision rights for anticipated rewards as an alternative to corruption: An experiment," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 188-204.
    14. Ahn, T.K. & Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James, 2010. "A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(12), pages 2624-2633, October.
    15. Massimo Finocchiaro Castro, 2004. "Cultural Education and the Voluntary Provision of Cultural Goods: An Experimental Study," Experimental 0404003, EconWPA, revised 27 Oct 2004.
    16. repec:eee:jeborg:v:138:y:2017:i:c:p:85-98 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Enrique Fatás & Tibor Neugebauer & Pilar Tamborero, 2004. "How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment," Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces E2004/58, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
    18. Vetter, Stefan, 2012. "Delegation and Rewards," Discussion Papers in Economics 12884, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    19. Claudia Keser & Gerrit Kimpel & Andreas Oestreicher, 2016. "Would a CCCTB mitigate profit shifting?," CIRANO Working Papers 2016s-29, CIRANO.
    20. Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2006. "Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(2), pages 103-121, June.
    21. Bosman, Ronald & Kräussl, Roman & Mirgorodskaya, Elizaveta, 2015. "The "tone effect" of news on investor beliefs: An experimental approach," CFS Working Paper Series 522, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    22. Edward J. Lopez & W. Robert Nelson, 2005. "The Endowment Effect in a Public Good Experiment," Experimental 0512001, EconWPA.

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