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Professionals and students in a lobbying experiment: Professional rules of conduct and subject surrogacy

  • Potters, Jan
  • van Winden, Frans

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 43 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 499-522

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:43:y:2000:i:4:p:499-522
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  1. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel., 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. repec:feb:framed:00135 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Plott, Charles R., . "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Working Papers 405, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. " Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-92, October.
  5. Anderson, Matthew J. & Sunder, Shyam, 1995. "Professional Traders as Intuitive Bayesians," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 185-202, November.
  6. Roth, Alvin E. & Vesna Prasnikar & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Shmuel Zamir, 1991. "Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1068-95, December.
  7. Potters, J.J.M. & van Winden, F., 1995. "Comparative statics of a signaling game : An experimental study," Discussion Paper 1995-126, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  8. Chan, Kenneth S. & Mestelman, Stuart & Muller, R. Andrew, 2008. "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
  9. Stuart Mestelman & David Feeny, 1988. "Does ideology matter?: Anecdotal experimental evidence on the voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 281-286, June.
  10. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Evolution, learning, and economic behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 3-24, February.
  11. Dyer, D. & Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D., 1988. "A Comparison Of Naive And Experienced Bidders In Common Value Offer Auctions A Laboratory Analysis," Papers 11, Houston - Department of Economics.
  12. Potters, Jan & Sloof, Randolph, 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 403-442, November.
  13. Douglas DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Wilfred Uecker, 1988. "A note on the use of businessmen as subjects in sealed offer markets," Artefactual Field Experiments 00039, The Field Experiments Website.
  14. Douglas Dyer & John Kagel, 1996. "Bidding in common value auctions: How the commercial construction industry corrects for the winner's curse," Framed Field Experiments 00144, The Field Experiments Website.
  15. Kagel, John H & Roth, Alvin E, 1992. "Theory and Misbehavior in First-Price Auctions: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(5), pages 1379-91, December.
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