IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

How Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experiment

  • Enrique Fatás

    ()

  • Tibor Neugebauer
  • Pilar Tamborero

The present paper reports on a political choice experiment with elected real-world politicians. A questionnaire on political and public issues is taken to examine whether prospect theory predicts the responses of experts from the field better than rational choice theory. The results indicate that framing effects exist but that expertise may weaken the deviation from rational choice.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.avantine.com/iesa/control/upfiles/Subject.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Luis Miguel Miller)


Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Institute for Social Syudies of Andalusia - Higher Council for Scientific Research in its series IESA Working Papers Series with number 0410.

as
in new window

Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:esa:iesawp:0410
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.d-andalucia.csic.es/iesa.htm

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Anderson, M.J. & Sunder, S., 1989. "Professional Traders As Intuitive Bayesians," GSIA Working Papers 88-89-51, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  2. Chan, Kenneth S. & Mestelman, Stuart & Muller, R. Andrew, 2008. "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier.
  3. Plott, Charles R., . "Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics," Working Papers 405, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1982. "Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(1), pages 1-9, January.
  5. Isaac, R. Mark & McCue, Kenneth F. & Plott, Charles R., . "Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment," Working Papers 428, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  6. Stuart Mestelman & David Feeny, 1988. "Does ideology matter?: Anecdotal experimental evidence on the voluntary provision of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 281-286, June.
  7. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. " Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
  8. Dyer, D. & Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D., 1988. "A Comparison Of Naive And Experienced Bidders In Common Value Offer Auctions A Laboratory Analysis," Papers 11, Houston - Department of Economics.
  9. Levin, Irwin P. & Schneider, Sandra L. & Gaeth, Gary J., 1998. "All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 149-188, November.
  10. Alvin E. Roth & V. Prasnikar & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & S. Zamir, 1998. "Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 344, David K. Levine.
  11. Douglas DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Wilfred Uecker, 1988. "A note on the use of businessmen as subjects in sealed offer markets," Artefactual Field Experiments 00039, The Field Experiments Website.
  12. Glaser, Markus & Langer, Thomas & Weber, Martin, 2003. "On the Trend Recognition and Forecasting Ability of Professional Traders," CEPR Discussion Papers 3904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Kuhberger, Anton, 1995. "The Framing of Decisions: A New Look at Old Problems," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 230-240, May.
  14. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7656, David K. Levine.
  15. Fagley, N. S. & Miller, Paul M., 1987. "The effects of decision framing on choice of risky vs certain options," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 264-277, April.
  16. Kuhberger, Anton, 1998. "The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-analysis," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 23-55, July.
  17. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 2000. "Professionals and students in a lobbying experiment: Professional rules of conduct and subject surrogacy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 499-522, December.
  18. Chris Starmer, 2000. "Developments in Non-expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(2), pages 332-382, June.
  19. Shanteau, James, 1992. "Competence in experts: The role of task characteristics," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 252-266, November.
  20. Smith, Vernon L, 1985. "Experimental Economics: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 264-72, March.
  21. Samuelson, William & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1988. " Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 7-59, March.
  22. Grether, David M & Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 575, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:esa:iesawp:0410. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luis Miguel Miller)

The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Luis Miguel Miller to update the entry or send us the correct address

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.