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US political corruption and quarterly conference calls

Author

Listed:
  • Chourou, Lamia
  • Hossain, Ashrafee T.
  • Jha, Anand

Abstract

We find that managers obfuscate during conference calls when their firm's headquarters is in a politically corrupt state, and they do so to shield assets from corrupt officials. The positive association between corruption and obfuscation by managers is much stronger when the expropriation risks are higher, such as when the firm (a) does not pay dividends, (b) is making a profit, (c) has more cash, (d) has fewer subsidiaries, and (e) is not making any political contributions. We do not find evidence that managers obfuscate during conference calls to hide their self-dealing.

Suggested Citation

  • Chourou, Lamia & Hossain, Ashrafee T. & Jha, Anand, 2024. "US political corruption and quarterly conference calls," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:161:y:2024:i:c:s0378426624000281
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2024.107108
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Obfuscation; Conference calls; Political corruption; Rent‑seeking; Shielding;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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