IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/japwor/v49y2019icp95-104.html

Employees who do not know their labour contract term and the implications for working conditions: Evidence from Japanese and Spanish microdata

Author

Listed:
  • Genda, Yuji
  • Heckel, Markus
  • Kambayashi, Ryo

Abstract

In this paper, we analyse the relationship between employees who do not know the length of their labour contract (hereafter, DNK employees) and working conditions. In developed countries, labour standards regulations generally require employers to provide a labour contract with a clearly defined duration to protect the fundamental rights of workers. However, the data reveal that in the developed countries on which we focus, Japan and Spain, non-negligible proportions of employees, 8% and 11%, respectively, do not know the duration of their labour contracts. Utilizing 2012 data from the Employment Status Survey for Japan and the Economically Active Population Survey for Spain, we find that whether workers are ignorant of their contract term commonly depends on their human capital level. Women, single people, younger and older workers and less-educated workers are more likely not to know their labour contract duration. Compared with other employees, DNK employees are more dissatisfied with their current job, more likely to search for other jobs and less likely to seek more work in their current jobs. We find that DNK employees suffer from a wage penalty for non-standard status and have less access to job training, as occurs in Japan, and that specific attributes, such as immigrant status, tend to be closely related to DNK status, as occurs in Spain. Overall, DNK employment is related to poor working conditions, which indicates the importance of educating workers about labour laws to maintain the welfare of disadvantaged workers.

Suggested Citation

  • Genda, Yuji & Heckel, Markus & Kambayashi, Ryo, 2019. "Employees who do not know their labour contract term and the implications for working conditions: Evidence from Japanese and Spanish microdata," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 95-104.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:japwor:v:49:y:2019:i:c:p:95-104
    DOI: 10.1016/j.japwor.2018.09.006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0922142518300458
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.japwor.2018.09.006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Rich & Joseph Tracy, 2004. "Uncertainty and Labor Contract Durations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 86(1), pages 270-287, February.
    2. Mathias Dewatripont, 1989. "Renegotiation and Information Revelation Over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(3), pages 589-619.
    3. Samuel Bentolila & Juan Dolado & Juan Jimeno, 2012. "Reforming an insider-outsider labor market: the Spanish experience," IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 1(1), pages 1-29, December.
    4. Mirela Ionela ACELEANU, 2013. "The labour market in the post-crisis economy: the case of Spain," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania / Editura Economica, vol. 0(3(580)), pages 135-146, March.
    5. David Kelsey & Willy Spanjers, 2004. "Ambiguity in Partnerships," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(497), pages 528-546, July.
    6. Núria Rodríguez-Planas & Natalia Nollenberger, 2016. "Labor market integration of new immigrants in Spain," IZA Journal of Labor Policy, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 5(1), pages 1-15, December.
    7. James Costain & Juan F. Jimeno & Carlos Thomas, 2010. "Employment fluctuations in a dual labour market," Economic Bulletin, Banco de España, issue APR, pages 129-137, April.
    8. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-932, September.
    9. Jang-Ok Cho & Thomas F. Cooley & Louis Phaneuf, 1997. "The Welfare Cost of Nominal Wage Contracting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(3), pages 465-484.
    10. Leaf Danziger, 1988. "Real Shocks, Efficient Risk Sharing, and the Duration of Labor Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(2), pages 435-440.
    11. Mathias Dewatripont, 1989. "Renegotiation and Information Revelation Over Time: The Case of Optimal Labor Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(3), pages 589-619.
    12. Ball, Laurence Markham, 1987. "Externalities from Contract Length," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 615-629, September.
    13. Dye, Ronald A, 1985. "Optimal Length of Labor Contracts," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 251-270, February.
    14. repec:agr:journl:v:3(580):y:2013:i:3(580):p:135-146 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Danziger, Leif, 2010. "Uniform and nonuniform staggering of wage contracts," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(6), pages 1038-1049, December.
    2. Hsuan-Yu Lin & Chih-Hai Yang, 2016. "Uncertainty, specific investment, and contract duration: evidence from the MLB player market," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 1009-1028, May.
    3. Danziger, Leif, 2008. "Extension of labor contracts and optimal backpay," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 18-36, February.
    4. Louis Christofides & Chen Peng, 2006. "Major Provisions of Labour Contracts and their Theoretical Coherence," CESifo Working Paper Series 1700, CESifo.
    5. Christofides, Louis N. & Peng, Chen, 2006. "Contract duration and indexation in a period of real and nominal uncertainty," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 61-86, February.
    6. Robert W. Rich & Joseph Tracy, 2011. "Early contract renegotiation: An analysis of U.S. labor contracts from 1970 to 1995," Staff Reports 521, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    7. Leif Danziger & Shoshana Neuman, 2005. "Delays in Renewal of Labor Contracts: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 341-372, April.
    8. Robert Rich & Joseph Tracy, 2013. "Early Contract Renegotiation: An Analysis of US Labor Contracts, 1970-1995," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(4), pages 825-842.
    9. Nir Klein, 2004. "Long-Term Contracts as a Strategic Device," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2004.16, Bank of Israel.
    10. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    11. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 109, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    12. Anna Sanz-de-Galdeano & Anastasia Terskaya, 2020. "The labor market in Spain, 2002–2018," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 403-403, March.
    13. Mehrdad Vahabi, 1999. "From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions," Post-Print halshs-03704424, HAL.
    14. Alan V. S. Douglas, 2003. "Corporate Investment Incentives and Accounting†Based Debt Covenants," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 20(4), pages 645-683, December.
    15. Bijapur, Mohan, 2011. "Moral hazard and renegotiation of multi-signal contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 56619, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Catherine Refait, 2005. "Soutien financier ou mise en faillite de l'entreprise? Comprendre la décision de la banque," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 8(1), pages 131-157, March.
    17. Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2010. "Competitive Markets without Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(6), pages 1079-1109.
    18. Joel Watson, 2013. "Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-40, August.
    19. Nikolaev, Valeri V., 2018. "Scope for renegotiation in private debt contracts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 270-301.
    20. Florence Eid, 2003. "Designing Institutions and Incentives in Hospitals: An Organization Economics Methodology," Working Papers 0339, Economic Research Forum, revised 12 2003.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
    • J81 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Working Conditions
    • J83 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Workers' Rights

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:japwor:v:49:y:2019:i:c:p:95-104. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505557 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.