The economics of franchise contracts and airport policy
In this paper, we apply insights from the economics of franchise contracts to the governance of airports and the evolution of airport policy in Canada. Some aspects of the devolution of airports in Canada could be consistent with a â€˜public franchiseâ€™ approach to airport policy. An examination of Canada's National Airport Policy and subsequent policy decisions, however, suggests that the government may have made the right decision for the wrong reasons. Applying the franchise perspective to European airport policy, recent decisions by the European Union regarding exclusive agreements between publicly owned airports and low-cost carriers suggest a departure from the incentive-compatibility requirements of franchise contracts that would promote market-based efficiency.
Volume (Year): 11 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-air-transport-management/|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Starkie, David, 2002. "Airport regulation and competition," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 63-72.
- Mathewson, G Frank & Winter, Ralph A, 1985. "The Economics of Franchise Contracts," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(3), pages 503-26, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jaitra:v:11:y:2005:i:1:p:43-48. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.