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The effects of malpractice non-economic damage caps on the supply of physician labor: Heterogeneity by physician age and risk

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  • Pesko, Michael F.
  • Cea, Meagan
  • Mendelsohn, Jayme
  • Bishop, Tara F.

Abstract

We explore the impact of malpractice caps on non-economic damages that were enacted between 2003 and 2006 on the supply of physician labor, separately for high-malpractice risk and low-malpractice risk physician specialty types, and separately by young and old physicians. We use physician data from the Area Resource File for 2000–2011 and malpractice policy data from the Database of State Tort Law Reforms. We study the impact of these caps using a reverse natural experiment, comparing physician supply in nine states enacting new caps to physician supply in ten states that had malpractice caps in place throughout the full time period. We use an event study to evaluate changes in physician labor compared to the prior year. We find evidence that non-economic damage caps increased the supply of high-risk physicians <35years of age by 0.93 physicians per 100,000 people in the year after the caps were enacted. Non-economic damage caps were cumulatively associated with an increase of 2.1 high-risk physicians <35years of age per 100,000 people. Stronger non-economic damage caps generally had a larger impact on physical supply.

Suggested Citation

  • Pesko, Michael F. & Cea, Meagan & Mendelsohn, Jayme & Bishop, Tara F., 2017. "The effects of malpractice non-economic damage caps on the supply of physician labor: Heterogeneity by physician age and risk," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 7-14.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:50:y:2017:i:c:p:7-14
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2017.03.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Charles L. Baum, 2020. "The effects of medical malpractice tort reform on physician supply an analysis of legislative changes from 2009 to 2016," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(2), pages 540-575, October.

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    Keywords

    Malpractice; Physician labor supply;

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