The certification hypothesis of fairness opinions for acquiring firms
We study the certification role of fairness opinions in corporate transactions in a simple non-cooperative setting with asymmetric information and possibly misaligned managerial incentives, and discuss the effect of different regulatory scenarios. Specifically, we compare three settings: one in which no third-party fairness opinion is available, one in which the management is required to obtain a fairness opinion before any transaction, and one in which the management’s decision to require a fairness opinion is voluntary. We compare shareholder value in each of the three scenarios and discuss implications for the optimal design of regulatory environments for fairness opinions.
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