IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Insurance bargaining under ambiguity

  • Huang, Rachel J.
  • Huang, Yi-Chieh
  • Tzeng, Larry Y.

This paper investigates the effects of an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity in an insurance bargaining game with a risk-and-ambiguity-neutral insurer and a risk-and-ambiguity-averse client. Both a cooperative and a non-cooperative bargaining game are examined. We show that, in both games, full coverage is optimal in the presence of ambiguity, and that the optimal premium is higher in the presence of ambiguity than in the absence of it. Furthermore, the optimal premium will increase with both the degree of ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167668713001558
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Insurance: Mathematics and Economics.

Volume (Year): 53 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 812-820

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:insuma:v:53:y:2013:i:3:p:812-820
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505554

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. David Alary & Christian Gollier & Nicolas Treich, 2013. "The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Insurance and Self‐protection," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(12), pages 1188-1202, December.
  2. Safra Zvi & Zilcha Itzhak, 1993. "Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 288-306, April.
  3. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-87, May.
  4. Gilboa, Itzhak & Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 141-153, April.
  5. Gollier, Christian, 2009. "Portfolio Choices and Asset Prices: The Comparative Statics of Ambiguity Aversion," TSE Working Papers 09-068, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  6. Sujoy Mukerji & Peter Klibanoff, 2002. "A Smooth Model of Decision,Making Under Ambiguity," Economics Series Working Papers 113, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  7. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  8. ANDERSSON Henrik & TREICH Nicolas, 2009. "The Value of a Statistical Life," LERNA Working Papers 09.04.280, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  9. Arthur Snow, 2011. "Ambiguity aversion and the propensities for self-insurance and self-protection," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 27-43, February.
  10. John Quiggin & Robert G. Chambers, 2007. "Bargaining power and efficiency in insurance contracts," Risk & Uncertainty Working Papers WP5R07, Risk and Sustainable Management Group, University of Queensland.
  11. Larry Epstein & Martin Schneider, 2004. "Ambiguity, Information Quality and Asset Pricing," RCER Working Papers 507, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  12. Schlesinger, Harris, 1984. "Two-person insurance negotiation," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 147-149, July.
  13. Aurelien Baillon & Olivier L'Haridon & Laetitia Placido, 2011. "Ambiguity Models and the Machina Paradoxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1547-60, June.
  14. Volij, Oscar & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes," Staff General Research Papers 10130, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  15. Laure Cabantous & Denis Hilton & Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 2010. "Is Imprecise Knowledge Better than Conflicting Expertise? Evidence from Insurers’ Decisions in the United States," ICBBR Working Papers 7, International Centre for Behavioural Business Research.
  16. Gollier, Christian, 2012. "Optimal insurance design of ambiguous risks," IDEI Working Papers 718, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2013.
  17. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  18. Arthur Snow, 2010. "Ambiguity and the value of information," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 133-145, April.
  19. TREICH Nicolas, 2008. "The value of a Statistical Life under Ambiguity Aversion," LERNA Working Papers 08.05.249, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
  20. Laure Cabantous, 2007. "Ambiguity Aversion in the Field of Insurance: Insurers’ Attitude to Imprecise and Conflicting Probability Estimates," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 219-240, May.
  21. Viaene, Stijn & Veugelers, Reinhilde & Dedene, Guido, 2002. "Insurance bargaining under risk aversion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 245-259, March.
  22. Ghirardato, Paolo & Maccheroni, Fabio & Marinacci, Massimo, 2004. "Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 133-173, October.
  23. White, Lucy, 2008. "Prudence in bargaining: The effect of uncertainty on bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 211-231, January.
  24. Huang, Rachel J., 2012. "Ambiguity aversion, higher-order risk attitude and optimal effort," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 338-345.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:insuma:v:53:y:2013:i:3:p:812-820. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.