IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/teavfo/33-90.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Bargaining Solutions Without The Expected Utility Hypothesis

Author

Listed:
  • ZILCHA
  • I.
  • SAFRA, Z.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Zilcha & I. & Safra, Z., 1990. "Bargaining Solutions Without The Expected Utility Hypothesis," Papers 33-90, Tel Aviv.
    • Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:33-90
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Driesen, Bram & Lombardi, Michele & Peters, Hans, 2016. "Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 162-170.
    2. Driesen, Bram & Perea, Andrés & Peters, Hans, 2012. "Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 103-118.
    3. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij & Eyal Winter, 2001. "The Time-Preference Nash Solution," Economic theory and game theory 014, Oscar Volij.
    4. Hanany, Eran & Safra, Zvi, 2000. "Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 254-276, February.
    5. Merlone, Ugo & Lupano, Matteo, 2022. "Third party funding: The minimum claim value," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 296(2), pages 738-747.
    6. Burgos, Albert & Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi, 2002. "Bargaining and Boldness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 28-51, January.
    7. Volij, Oscar, 2002. "A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 17-24, September.
    8. Philip Grech & Oriol Tejada, 2018. "Divide the dollar and conquer more: sequential bargaining and risk aversion," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1261-1286, November.
    9. Volij, Oscar & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 120-140, October.
    10. Kobberling, Veronika & Peters, Hans, 2003. "The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 154-175, May.
    11. Zhang, Jing & Zhuang, Jun & Jose, Victor Richmond R., 2018. "The role of risk preferences in a multi-target defender-attacker resource allocation game," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 95-104.
    12. Huang, Rachel J. & Huang, Yi-Chieh & Tzeng, Larry Y., 2013. "Insurance bargaining under ambiguity," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 812-820.
    13. Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan, 2019. "Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in the Rubinstein Bargaining Game with Loss Aversion," Complexity, Hindawi, vol. 2019, pages 1-23, March.
    14. Smorodinsky, Rann, 2005. "Nash's bargaining solution when the disagreement point is random," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 3-11, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:33-90. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fotauil.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.