Mobile application pricing
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
KeywordsPlatform; Two-sided markets; Complements; Most favoured customer clause;
- L17 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Open Source Products and Markets
- L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
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