Turning the Page on Business Formats for Digital Platforms: Does Apple's Agency Model Soften Competition?
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Franz Wirl, 2015. "Downstream and upstream oligopolies when retailer’s effort matters," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 116(2), pages 99-127, October.
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More about this item
Keywordsthe agency model; resale price maintenance; most-favored nation clauses; revenue sharing;
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
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