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A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space

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  • Wurman, Peter R.
  • Wellman, Michael P.
  • Walsh, William E.

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  • Wurman, Peter R. & Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E., 2001. "A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 304-338, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:35:y:2001:i:1-2:p:304-338
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    8. Peter R. Wurman & Michael P. Wellman, 1999. "Equilibrium Prices in Bundle Auctions," Working Papers 99-09-064, Santa Fe Institute.
    9. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-872, August.
    10. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
    11. McAfee, R. Preston, 1992. "A dominant strategy double auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 434-450, April.
    12. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    13. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    14. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1980. "State of the Art---Auctions and Bidding Models: A Survey," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 26(2), pages 119-142, February.
    15. John McMillan, 1994. "Selling Spectrum Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 145-162, Summer.
    16. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
    17. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
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    2. Iftekhar, M. S. & Tisdell, J. G., 2018. "Learning in repeated multiple unit combinatorial auctions: An experimental study," Working Papers 267301, University of Western Australia, School of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    3. Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E. & Wurman, Peter R. & MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K., 2001. "Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 271-303, April.
    4. Eymann, Torsten & Reinicke, Michael & Streitberger, Werner & Schnizler, Björn & Veit, Daniel & Freitag, Felix & Chao, Isaac & Chacin, Pablo & Neumann, Dirk, 2005. "Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1," Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems Management 7, University of Bayreuth, Chair of Information Systems Management.
    5. Heilmann, Erik & Klempp, Nikolai & Wetzel, Heike, 2020. "Design of regional flexibility markets for electricity: A product classification framework for and application to German pilot projects," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    6. Teich, Jeffrey E. & Wallenius, Hannele & Wallenius, Jyrki & Koppius, Otto R., 2004. "Emerging multiple issue e-auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 159(1), pages 1-16, November.
    7. Amelia BADICA & Georgeta SOAVA, 2008. "Intelligent Agents - a Tool for Modeling Intermediation and Negotiation Processes," Annals of University of Craiova - Economic Sciences Series, University of Craiova, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 3(36), pages 1222-1232, May.
    8. Guerrero, Jaysson & Gebbran, Daniel & Mhanna, Sleiman & Chapman, Archie C. & Verbič, Gregor, 2020. "Towards a transactive energy system for integration of distributed energy resources: Home energy management, distributed optimal power flow, and peer-to-peer energy trading," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    9. Shih-Fen Cheng & Evan Leung & Kevin M. Lochner & Kevin O'Malley & Daniel M. Reeves & L. Julian Schvartzman & Michael P. Wellman, 2003. "Walverine: A Walrasian Trading Agent," Computational Economics 0302003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Schnizler, Björn & Neumann, Dirk & Veit, Daniel & Napoletano, Mauro & Catalano, Michele & Gallegati, Mauro & Reinicke, Michael & Streitberger, Werner & Eymann, Torsten, 2005. "Environmental analysis for application layer networks," Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems Management 1, University of Bayreuth, Chair of Information Systems Management.
    11. Erik Heilmann & Nikolai Klempp & Heike Wetzel, 2020. "Market design of regional flexibility markets: A classification metric for flexibility products and its application to German prototypical flexibility markets," MAGKS Papers on Economics 202002, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    12. Grosof, Benjamin & Reeves, Daniel & Wellman, Michael, 2002. "Automated Negotiation from Declarative Contract Descriptions," Working papers 4188-01, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    13. Shazib E. Shaikh & Nikolay Mehandjiev, 2007. "E-Business Process Negotiation : Formal Requirements for Strategy Support," Microeconomics Working Papers 22278, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    14. Mariusz Kaleta, 2020. "Aided design of market mechanisms for electricity clusters," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 28(4), pages 1291-1314, December.
    15. Schnizler, Björn & Neumann, Dirk & Veit, Daniel & Reinicke, Michael & Streitberger, Werner & Eymann, Torsten & Freitag, Felix & Chao, Isaac & Chacin, Pablo, 2007. "A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS," Bayreuth Reports on Information Systems Management 21, University of Bayreuth, Chair of Information Systems Management.
    16. Gediminas Adomavicius & Alok Gupta & Dmitry Zhdanov, 2009. "Designing Intelligent Software Agents for Auctions with Limited Information Feedback," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 20(4), pages 507-526, December.
    17. Jawad Abrache & Teodor Crainic & Michel Gendreau & Monia Rekik, 2007. "Combinatorial auctions," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 153(1), pages 131-164, September.

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