Theoretical and Computational Basis for Economical Ressource Allocation in Application Layer Networks - Annual Report Year 1
This paper identifies and defines suitable market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:|
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- Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E. & Wurman, Peter R. & MacKie-Mason, Jeffrey K., 2001. "Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 271-303, April.
- Wurman, Peter R. & Wellman, Michael P. & Walsh, William E., 2001. "A Parametrization of the Auction Design Space," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 35(1-2), pages 304-338, April.
- Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Dynamic Markets with Competitive Bidding," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 71-84.
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