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An overlapping generations model of taxpayer bailouts of banks

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  • Shy, Oz
  • Stenbacka, Rune

Abstract

The paper constructs an overlapping generations model to evaluate how different bank rescue plans affect banks’ risk-taking incentives. For a non-competitive banking industry, we find bailout with tax imposed on the old generation or equity bail-in to be efficient policies in the sense that they implement socially optimal risk-taking. In a competitive banking sector, no-bailout implements the socially-optimal risk-taking. Bailout policies financed by a tax imposed on the young generation always induce excessive risk-taking.

Suggested Citation

  • Shy, Oz & Stenbacka, Rune, 2017. "An overlapping generations model of taxpayer bailouts of banks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 71-80.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:33:y:2017:i:c:p:71-80
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2017.10.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Stenbacka, Rune & Takalo, Tuomas, 2019. "Switching costs and financial stability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 14-24.
    2. Badarau, Cristina & Lapteacru, Ion, 2020. "Bank risk, competition and bank connectedness with firms: A literature review," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    3. Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, 2019. "Bank competition, real investments, and welfare," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 73-90, June.
    4. Philippe Oster, 2020. "Contingent Convertible bond literature review: making everything and nothing possible?," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 21(4), pages 343-381, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank failures; Taxpayer bailout of banks; Equity bail-in; Risk-taking by banks; Financial fragility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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