IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finlet/v78y2025ics1544612325004143.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Firm-level litigation risk and CEO equity incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Hossain, Ashrafee T.
  • Attig, Najah
  • Hebb, Greg
  • Hasan, Mostafa

Abstract

Using Kim and Skinner's (2012) framework, we document a positive association between firm-level litigation risk and CEOs’ equity incentives. This relationship remains robust when using an entropy-balanced sample, alternative regression specifications, a Granger causality test, and a difference-in-differences analysis leveraging Obama's election as an exogenous shock. Our results are also consistent across various restricted samples and alternative proxies for litigation risk and CEO pay. Additional tests indicate that this association is stronger (weaker) in firms with weaker (stronger) corporate governance. Furthermore, we find that the market responds more (less) favorably to risk-to-pay incentives in firms with strong (weak) governance. These findings suggest that regulators should strengthen corporate governance frameworks.

Suggested Citation

  • Hossain, Ashrafee T. & Attig, Najah & Hebb, Greg & Hasan, Mostafa, 2025. "Firm-level litigation risk and CEO equity incentives," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:78:y:2025:i:c:s1544612325004143
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2025.107151
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612325004143
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.frl.2025.107151?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Litigation risk; Executive compensation; Equity incentives;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:78:y:2025:i:c:s1544612325004143. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/frl .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.