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Does the Achilles heel of guarantee networks drive financial distress?

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  • Shan, Yuan George
  • Wang, Yirui
  • Wu, Wuqing
  • Zhen, Weihao

Abstract

To explore characteristics of guarantee networks that drive financial distress, we use a dataset comprising 20,467 firm-year observations from Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and the Shenzhen Stock Exchanges to construct networks from 85,229 guarantee relationships. We show that guarantee networks have a negative effect on company financial distress, revealed by cash holdings and long-term liabilities. Larger networks, those with an Achilles heel, and companies with high closeness centrality exacerbate this effect, and companies in a stronger financial position suffer greater negative impacts. Guarantee networks may also exert their negative impact by acting as a channel for shareholder tunneling.

Suggested Citation

  • Shan, Yuan George & Wang, Yirui & Wu, Wuqing & Zhen, Weihao, 2023. "Does the Achilles heel of guarantee networks drive financial distress?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:87:y:2023:i:c:s1057521923001515
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102635
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Achilles heel; Debt repayment; Financial distress; Guarantee network; Shareholder tunneling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C88 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Other Computer Software
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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