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Electoral fraud, the rise of Peron and demise of checks and balances in Argentina

  • Alston, Lee J.
  • Gallo, Andrés A.

The future looked bright for Argentina in the early twentieth century. It had already achieved high levels of income per capita and was moving away from authoritarian government towards a more open democracy. Unfortunately, Argentina never finished the transition. The turning point occurred in the 1930s when to stay in power, the Conservatives in the Pampas resorted to electoral fraud, which neither the legislative, executive, or judicial branches checked. The decade of unchecked electoral fraud led to the support for Juan Peron and subsequently to political and economic instability.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Explorations in Economic History.

Volume (Year): 47 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 179-197

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Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:47:y:2010:i:2:p:179-197
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622830

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