A game-theoretic approach for the sustainable development of public bus fleet under government policies considering passenger behavior: A case study of China

In recent years, with the increasing awareness and concerns about global warming and the adverse effects of greenhouse gases (GHGs), efforts have been made in public transportation to utilize electric buses (EBs) powered by electricity generated from renewable energy sources. This approach shows promising potential in decreasing GHG emissions and fossil fuels dependence in transport sector. In this research, a game model is established between different stakeholders in the field of public transportation, including passengers, public transport service providers (PTS), and bus manufacturers, with the aim of finding the best strategies for the sustainable development of the intercity public bus fleet under different government policies. Considering various government policies, the manufacturer maximizes its profit by determining the price of buses, the PTS tries to increase its income by determining the type and number of each type of bus, and passengers also choose the best travel mode. Additionally, sensitivity analysis was conducted to explore the effects of main parameters on equilibrium solutions. The novelty of this model lies in the combination of passengers' preferences to use either public transport or private cars and the problem of deciding the size of the public bus fleet. Analyses indicate that the cap-and-trade (C&T) policy cannot be a suitable replacement for the subsidy-and-tax policy under current conditions. Also, the results indicate that the best government policy from the bus manufacturer's perspective is no policy implementation (NI) by the government, and from the PTS's perspective, it is the policy of subsidies and taxes.