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The peculiar economics of federal energy management

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  • Canes, Michael E.

Abstract

US federal agency energy managers face different constraints than do comparable private sector managers. They are faced with energy consumption goals mandated via legislation or directed via Presidential Executive Order that encourage if not compel them to invest more in energy efficiency or renewables than would be cost effective from a private sector perspective. To make such investments, they also are provided access to private capital that is additional to their agency budgets. The encouragement to invest beyond what is cost effective may be a source of waste in some instances, and the financing mechanisms appear more expensive than necessary. A rough estimate of the magnitude of the waste is offered, as well as a mechanism to reduce the costs of agency access to capital.

Suggested Citation

  • Canes, Michael E., 2016. "The peculiar economics of federal energy management," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 268-272.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:91:y:2016:i:c:p:268-272
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2015.12.043
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Meredith Fowlie & Michael Greenstone & Catherine Wolfram, 2018. "Do Energy Efficiency Investments Deliver? Evidence from the Weatherization Assistance Program," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(3), pages 1597-1644.
    3. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Canes, Michael E., 2017. "The inefficient financing of federal agency energy projects," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 28-31.

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