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On quota violations of OPEC members

Author

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  • Ghoddusi, Hamed
  • Nili, Masoud
  • Rastad, Mahdi

Abstract

Over the last decades quota violations have become a norm for OPEC countries. However, the academic literature on OPEC focuses more on its production behavior than on analyzing the quota allocation process or characterizing quota violation patterns. This paper offers a theoretical model with empirical evidence to explain OPEC members' incentives for abiding or violating quotas. We first offer a cartel model with a quota allocation rule and an endogenous capacity choice. The model highlights the trade-off between building spare capacity to bargain for a higher legitimate quota versus risking quota violation punishment. Using the quarterly data from 1995 to 2007, we empirically support the main results and intuitions for the model. Our empirical evidence is consistent with a theoretical framing in which capacity constraints work as an enforcement mechanism in good times and OPEC's quota system disciplining its members in bad times.

Suggested Citation

  • Ghoddusi, Hamed & Nili, Masoud & Rastad, Mahdi, 2017. "On quota violations of OPEC members," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 410-422.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:68:y:2017:i:c:p:410-422
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.10.016
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    Cited by:

    1. Hamed Ghoddusi & Franz Wirl, 2019. "A Risk-Hedging View to Refinery Capacity Investment," Working Papers 1327, Economic Research Forum, revised 21 Aug 2019.
    2. Yue Liu & Hao Dong & Pierre Failler, 2019. "The Oil Market Reactions to OPEC’s Announcements," Energies, MDPI, vol. 12(17), pages 1-15, August.
    3. Ibrahim A. Adekunle & Olukayode E. Maku & Tolulope O. Williams & Judith Gbagidi & Emmanuel O. Ajike, 2023. "Natural Resource Endowments and Growth Dynamics in Africa: Evidence from Panel Cointegrating Regression," Working Papers of the African Governance and Development Institute. 23/015, African Governance and Development Institute..
    4. Kheiravar, Khaled H, 2019. "Economic and Econometric Analyses of the World Petroleum Industry, Energy Subsidies, and Air Pollution," Institute of Transportation Studies, Working Paper Series qt3gj151w9, Institute of Transportation Studies, UC Davis.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Energy; OPEC; Cartels; Oil market; Compliance; Quota; Cournot duopoly; Collusion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • Q35 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Hydrocarbon Resources
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices

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