A developing Asia emission trading scheme (Asia ETS)
This paper provides a model assessment of the role of developing Asia in the context of climate change policies. We diagnose the potential response of Asian economies to the imposition of various climate policies, showing that if we were to equally price carbon across the world roughly half of the abatement would occur in developing Asia. We show that such autarkic measures would be consistent with the policy targets put forward by the Major Economies Forum but would not necessarily be equitable. We thus propose a fragmented cap-and-trade scheme with a specific regional market for developing Asia, the Asian Emission Trading Scheme (Asia ETS). We assess the role of the Asia ETS on the macro-economy and international transfers vis-à- vis the standard case of global trading. Our results indicate that creating two large trading markets would result in small global efficiency losses, while at the same time generating more reasonable regional incentives and transfers.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009.
"The Incentives to Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions: A Game-Theoretic Approach Using the WITCH Model,"
OECD Economics Department Working Papers
702, OECD Publishing.
- Carlo Carraro & Valentina Bosetti & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions: a game theoretic approach using the WITCH Model," Working Papers 2009_28, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Judson Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, 2008.
"Linkage of Tradable Permit Systems in International Climate Policy Architecture,"
NBER Working Papers
14432, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jaffe, Judson & Stavins, Robert, 2008. "Linkage of Tradable Permit Systems in International Climate Policy Architecture," Working Paper Series rwp08-053, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Robert N. Stavins & Judson Jaffe, 2008. "Linkage of Tradable Permit Systems in International Climate Policy Architecture," Working Papers 2008.90, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Jotzo, Frank & Betz, Regina, 2009.
"Linking the Australian Emissions Trading Scheme,"
94814, Australian National University, Environmental Economics Research Hub.
- Frank Jotzo & Regina Betz, 2009. "Linking the Australian Emissions Trading Scheme," Environmental Economics Research Hub Research Reports 0914, Environmental Economics Research Hub, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
- Emanuele Massetti, 2011. "Carbon tax scenarios for China and India: exploring politically feasible mitigation goals," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 209-227, September.
- Carraro, Carlo & Massetti, Emanuele, 2012.
"Energy and Climate Change in China,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
8895, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Massimo Tavoni & Shoibal Chakravarty & Robert Socolow, 2012.
"Safe vs. Fair: A Formidable Trade-off in Tackling Climate Change,"
MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(2), pages 210, February.
- Massimo Tavoni & Shoibal Chakravarty & Robert Socolow, 2011. "Safe vs. Fair: A Formidable Trade-off in Tackling Climate Change," Working Papers 2011.61, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model," Working Papers 2009.64, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Hansson, Julia & Berndes, Gran & Johnsson, Filip & Kjrstad, Jan, 2009. "Co-firing biomass with coal for electricity generation--An assessment of the potential in EU27," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 1444-1455, April.
- Barrett, Scott, 1997. "The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 345-361, November.
- Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
- Calvin, Katherine & Clarke, Leon & Krey, Volker & Blanford, Geoffrey & Jiang, Kejun & Kainuma, Mikiko & Kriegler, Elmar & Luderer, Gunnar & Shukla, P.R., 2012. "The role of Asia in mitigating climate change: Results from the Asia modeling exercise," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(S3), pages S251-S260.
- Michael Mehling & Erik Haites, 2009. "Mechanisms for linking emissions trading schemes," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(2), pages 169-184, January.
- Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Marzio Galeotti & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2006. "WITCH. A World Induced Technical Change Hybrid Model," Working Papers 2006_46, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:34:y:2012:i:s3:p:s436-s443. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.