Inspection games in arms control
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- O'Neill, Barry, 1994. "Game theory models of peace and war," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 29, pages 995-1053 Elsevier.
- Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J., 1992. "Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control," Working Papers 92-07, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, June.
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