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Evaluating the strategic behavior of cement producers: An equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints

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Listed:
  • Allevi, E.
  • Conejo, A.J.
  • Oggioni, G.
  • Riccardi, R.
  • Ruiz, C.

Abstract

This paper investigates the equilibria reached by a number of strategic producers in the cement sector through a technological representation of the market. We present a bilevel model for each producer that characterizes its profit maximizing behavior. In the bilevel model, the upper-level problem of each producer is constrained by a lower-level market clearing problem representing cement trading and whose objective function corresponds to social welfare. Replacing the lower level problem by its optimality condition yields a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). Then, all strategic producers are jointly considered. Representing their interaction requires solving jointly the interrelated MPECs of all producers, which results in an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC).

Suggested Citation

  • Allevi, E. & Conejo, A.J. & Oggioni, G. & Riccardi, R. & Ruiz, C., 2018. "Evaluating the strategic behavior of cement producers: An equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 264(2), pages 717-731.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:264:y:2018:i:2:p:717-731
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2017.06.043
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Laura Carosi & Ana Camanho & Giovanna D’Inverno & Kristof Witte & Rossana Riccardi, 2020. "Preface to the special issue on performance measurement and efficiency analysis—theory and practice," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 43(2), pages 409-412, December.
    2. G. Constante-Flores & A. J. Conejo & S. Constante-Flores, 2022. "Solving certain complementarity problems in power markets via convex programming," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 30(3), pages 465-491, October.
    3. Liu, Lu & Feng, Lipan & Jiang, Tao & Zhang, Qian, 2021. "The impact of supply chain competition on the introduction of clean development mechanisms," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).

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