Strategies for detecting fraudulent claims in the automobile insurance industry
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Pierre Picard, 2012. "Economic Analysis of Insurance Fraud," Working Papers hal-00725561, HAL.
- Bond, E.W. & Crocker, K.J., 1993.
"Hardball and the Soft Touch: The Economics of Optimal Insurance Contracts with Costly State Verification and Endogenous Monitoring Costs,"
10-93-1b, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Bond, Eric W. & Crocker, Keith J., 1997. "Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 239-264, January.
- G. Dionne & F. Giuliano & P. Picard, 2002.
"Optimal auditing for insurance fraud,"
THEMA Working Papers
2002-32, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Stijn Viaene & Guido Dedene, 2004. "Insurance Fraud: Issues and Challenges," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 29(2), pages 313-333, April.
- Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P. & Vanasse, C., 1989.
"Moral Hazard, Optimal Auditing and Workers' Compensation,"
Cahiers de recherche
8941, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Dionne, G. & St-Michel, P. & Vanasse, C., 1989. "Moral Hazard, Optimal Auditing And Workers' Compensation," Cahiers de recherche 8941, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- El Bachir Belhadji & George Dionne & Faouzi Tarkhani, 2000. "A Model for the Detection of Insurance Fraud*," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(4), pages 517-538, October.
- Picard, Pierre, 1996. "Auditing claims in the insurance market with fraud: The credibility issue," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 27-56, December.
- Richard Watt, 2003. "Curtailing Ex-Post Fraud in Risk Sharing Arrangements," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 247-263, September.
- Artis, Manuel & Ayuso, Mercedes & Guillen, Montserrat, 1999. "Modelling different types of automobile insurance fraud behaviour in the Spanish market," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 67-81, March.
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