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Selection Bias and Auditing Policies for Insurance Claims

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  • Jean Pinquet
  • Mercedes Ayuso
  • Montserrat Guillén

Abstract

Selection bias results from a discrepancy between the range of estimation of a statistical model and its range of application. This is the case for fraud risk models, which are estimated on audited claims but applied on incoming claims in the design of auditing strategies. Now audited claims are a minority within the parent sample since they are chosen after a severe selection performed by claims adjusters. This article presents a statistical approach that counteracts selection bias without using a random auditing strategy. A two‐equation model on audit and fraud (a bivariate probit model with censoring) is estimated on a sample of claims where the experts are left free to take the audit decision. The expected overestimation of fraud risk derived from a single‐equation model is corrected. Results are close to those obtained with a random auditing strategy, at the expense of some instability with respect to the regression components set. Then we compare auditing policies derived from the different approaches.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Pinquet & Mercedes Ayuso & Montserrat Guillén, 2007. "Selection Bias and Auditing Policies for Insurance Claims," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 425-440, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jrinsu:v:74:y:2007:i:2:p:425-440
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6975.2007.00219.x
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    Cited by:

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    2. Benedek Botond & László Ede, 2019. "Identifying Key Fraud Indicators in the Automobile Insurance Industry Using SQL Server Analysis Services," Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Oeconomica, Sciendo, vol. 64(2), pages 53-71, August.
    3. Jing Ai & Patrick L. Brockett & Linda L. Golden & Montserrat Guillén, 2013. "A Robust Unsupervised Method for Fraud Rate Estimation," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 80(1), pages 121-143, March.
    4. Ina Garnefeld & Andreas Eggert & Markus Husemann-Kopetzky & Eva Böhm, 2019. "Exploring the link between payment schemes and customer fraud: a mental accounting perspective," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 47(4), pages 595-616, July.
    5. Bermúdez, Ll. & Pérez, J.M. & Ayuso, M. & Gómez, E. & Vázquez, F.J., 2008. "A Bayesian dichotomous model with asymmetric link for fraud in insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 779-786, April.
    6. Yankol-Schalck, Meryem, 2022. "The value of cross-data set analysis for automobile insurance fraud detection," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).

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