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Competition between insurers with superior information

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  • Villeneuve, Bertrand

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  • Villeneuve, Bertrand, 2005. "Competition between insurers with superior information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 321-340, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:49:y:2005:i:2:p:321-340
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Winand Emons, 1997. "Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
    2. Mark N. Hertzendorf & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 2001. "Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 621-662, December.
    3. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    4. M.- C. Fagart, 1996. "Compagnies d'assurance informées et équilibre sur le marché de l'assurance," THEMA Working Papers 96-26, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    5. David Hemenway, 1990. "Propitious Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(4), pages 1063-1069.
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Die allwissende Versicherung
      by Johannes Pennekamp in Fazit on 2014-05-22 12:27:11

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    Cited by:

    1. Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca G., 2011. "Competition and the signaling role of prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 412-425, July.
    2. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
    3. Deryugina, Tatyana, 2012. "Does Selection in Insurance Markets Always Favor Buyers?," MPRA Paper 53583, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Georges Dionne & Casey Rothschild, 2014. "Economic Effects of Risk Classification Bans," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 39(2), pages 184-221, September.
    5. Philip Bond & David K. Musto & Bilge Yilmaz, 2008. "Predatory mortgage lending," Working Papers 08-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    6. S. Hun Seog, 2009. "Insurance Markets With Differential Information," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 279-294.
    7. Rothschild, Casey G., 2009. "Adverse selection in annuity markets: Evidence from the British Life Annuity Act of 1808," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 776-784, June.
    8. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2015. "Pessimistic information gathering," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 75-96.
    9. Ross Tippit, 2014. "Lender deception as a response to moral hazard," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 113(1), pages 59-77, September.
    10. Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1231, CIRPEE.
    11. Iossa, Elisabetta & Martimort, David, 2013. "Hidden Action or Hidden Information? How Information Gathering Shapes Contract Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 9552, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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