The welfare effect of income tax deductions for losses as insurance: Insured- versus insurer-sided adverse selection
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/5367 is not listed on IDEAS
- Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2006.
"Intergenerational Transfer of Human Capital and Optimal Education Policy,"
Journal of Public Economic Theory,
Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(4), pages 529-545, October.
- CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2003. "Intergenerational transfer of human capital and optimal education policy," CORE Discussion Papers 2003030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Intergenerational Transfer of Human Capital and Optimal Education Policy," IDEI Working Papers 318, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2004. "Intergenerational Transfer of Human Capital and Optimal Education Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 4201, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2006. "Intergenerational transfer of human capital and optimal education policy," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1876, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- repec:dau:papers:123456789/5356 is not listed on IDEAS
- Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010.
"Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance,
The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84.
- Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2009. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," NBER Working Papers 15586, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Georges Dionne & Christian Gourieroux & Charles Vanasse, 2001. "Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 444-473, April.
- Kuniyoshi Saito, 2006. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market Under Rate Regulation," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(2), pages 335-356.
- Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
- Bertrand Villeneuve, 2000. "The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 25(1), pages 65-79, June.
- S. Hun Seog, 2009. "Insurance Markets With Differential Information," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 279-294.
- Kaplow, Louis, 1992. "Income Tax Deductions for Losses as Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1013-1017, September.
- Boyer, M Martin, 2000. " Insurance Taxation and Insurance Fraud," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(1), pages 101-134.
- Kaplow, Louis, 1991. "Incentives and Government Relief for Risk," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 167-175, April.
- Kessing, Sebastian G. & Konrad, Kai A., 2006. "Union strategy and optimal direct taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 393-402, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Wu, T.C. Michael & Yang, C.C., 2014. "Income tax deductions for losses as insurance revisited," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 274-280.
More about this item
KeywordsIncome tax deductions for losses; Informed insurer; Adverse selection;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:29:y:2012:i:6:p:2641-2645. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/30411 .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.