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Intergenerational transfer of human capital and optimal education policy

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  • CREMER, Helmuth
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

Abstract

We study the design of education policies (subsidies and public education) when parents' investment in education is motivated by warm-glow altruism and determines the probability that a child has a high ability. The optimal subsidy is not necessarily positive. It is determined by two conflicting terms: a Pigouvian term (warm-glow altruists do not properly account for the impact of education on future generations) and a "paternalistic" effect (the warm-glow term may not be fully included in social welfare). Finally, total crowding out of private expenditure (for one of the types) by public education may be desirable. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..
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Suggested Citation

  • CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2006. "Intergenerational transfer of human capital and optimal education policy," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1876, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1876
    Note: In : Journal of Public Economic Theory, 8(4), 529-545, 2006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gianni de Fraja, 2002. "The Design of Optimal Education Policies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 437-466.
    2. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2003. "Capital income taxation when inherited wealth is not observable," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2475-2490, October.
    3. Oded Galor & Joseph Zeira, 1993. "Income Distribution and Macroeconomics," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 35-52.
    4. Raquel Fernandez & Richard Rogerson, 1996. "Income Distribution, Communities, and the Quality of Public Education," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(1), pages 135-164.
    5. Roland Benabou, 2002. "Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous-Agent Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 481-517, March.
    6. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75.
    7. Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B, 1992. "Public versus Private Investment in Human Capital Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 818-834, August.
    8. Andreoni, James, 1989. "Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1447-1458, December.
    9. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1997. "In-kind transfers, self-selection and optimal tax policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 97-114, January.
    10. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz & Ladoux, Norbert, 1998. "Externalities and optimal taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 343-364, December.
    11. Drazen, Allan, 1978. "Government Debt, Human Capital, and Bequests in a Life-Cycle Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(3), pages 505-516, June.
    12. Costas Azariadis & Allan Drazen, 1990. "Threshold Externalities in Economic Development," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 105(2), pages 501-526.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Marion Davin & Karine Gente & Carine Nourry, 2012. "Social optimum in an OLG model with paternalistic altruism," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(4), pages 3417-3424.
    2. Nikos Benos, 2004. "Education Policies and Economic Growth," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 4-2004, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    3. Bernasconi, Michele & Profeta, Paola, 2012. "Public education and redistribution when talents are mismatched," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 84-96.
    4. Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 2011. "The Tax Treatment of Intergenerational Wealth Transfers ," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 57(2), pages 365-401, June.
    5. Michele Bernasconi & Paola Profeta, 2007. "Redistribution or Education? The Political Economy of the Social Race," CESifo Working Paper Series 1934, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Helmuth Cremer & ) & Pierre Pestieau, 2003. "Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Survey," Public Economics 0311003, EconWPA.
    7. Genicot, Garance, 2016. "Two-sided altruism and signaling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 92-97.
    8. Theodore Palivos & Dimitrios Varvarigos, 2013. "Intergenerational Complementarities in Education, Endogenous Public Policy, and the Relation Between Growth and Volatility," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(2), pages 249-272, April.
    9. Alessandra Casarico & Luca Micheletto & Alessandro Sommacal, 2015. "Intergenerational transmission of skills during childhood and optimal public policy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 353-372, April.
    10. Alessandra Casarico & Alessandro Sommacal, 2012. "Labor Income Taxation, Human Capital, and Growth: The Role of Childcare," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 114(4), pages 1182-1207, December.
    11. Francesca Carta, 2013. "Investing in the youngest: the optimal child care policy," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 180, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    12. Wu, T.C. Michael & Yang, C.C., 2012. "The welfare effect of income tax deductions for losses as insurance: Insured- versus insurer-sided adverse selection," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2641-2645.
    13. Cremer, Helmuth & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie & Pestieau, Pierre, 2016. "The design of long term care insurance contracts," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 330-339.
    14. C. Fan & Jie Zhang, 2013. "Differential fertility and intergenerational mobility under private versus public education," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 907-941, July.
    15. Wu, T.C. Michael & Yang, C.C., 2014. "Income tax deductions for losses as insurance revisited," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 274-280.
    16. Sano, Koichiro & Tomoda, Yasunobu, 2010. "Optimal public education policy in a two sector model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 991-995, September.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy

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