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Talent discovery, layoff risk and unemployment insurance

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  • Pagano, Marco
  • Picariello, Luca

Abstract

In talent-intensive jobs, workers’ quality is revealed by their performance. This enhances productivity and earnings, but also increases layoff risk. We show that, if firms compete for talent, they cannot insure workers against this risk, so that the more risk-averse workers will choose less quality-revealing jobs. This lowers expected productivity and salaries. Our model predicts that public unemployment insurance corrects this inefficiency, increasing employment in talent-sensitive industries. This prediction is consistent with the distribution of U.S. employment across occupations and states. Unemployment insurance dominates legal restrictions on firms’ dismissals, which penalize more talent-sensitive firms and thus depress expected productivity.

Suggested Citation

  • Pagano, Marco & Picariello, Luca, 2023. "Talent discovery, layoff risk and unemployment insurance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:154:y:2023:i:c:s0014292123000351
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104406
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    1. Pagano, Marco, 2020. "Risk Sharing Within the Firm: A Primer," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 12(2), pages 117-198, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Talent; Learning; Layoff risk; Unemployment insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings

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