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On the full dimensionality assumption for the discounted Folk Theorem

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  • Carmona, Guilherme

Abstract

A sufficient condition for the discounted Folk Theorem is that for every individually rational payoff vector u, there exists another individually rational payoff vector v such that vÂ

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  • Carmona, Guilherme, 2008. "On the full dimensionality assumption for the discounted Folk Theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 357-359, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:357-359
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Abreu, Dilip & Dutta, Prajit K & Smith, Lones, 1994. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A NEU Condition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 939-948, July.
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