Patents and R&D: The tournament effect
We identify a new route through which patent protection may affect R&D incentives, the tournament effect. It may decrease R\&D incentives, in which case patent protection may either adversely affect the level of R&D, or may discourage licensing. In either case welfare may fall.
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2003. "The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1," Levine's Working Paper Archive 234936000000000028, David K. Levine.
- Boldrin, Michele & Levine, David, 2002.
"The Case Against Intellectual Property,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3273, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, August.
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