Patents and R&D: The tournament effect
We identify a new route through which patent protection may affect R&D incentives, the tournament effect. It may decrease R\&D incentives, in which case patent protection may either adversely affect the level of R&D, or may discourage licensing. In either case welfare may fall.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2002.
"The Case Against Intellectual Property,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000003, David K. Levine.
- Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x.
- Michele Boldrin & David K Levine, 2003. "The Case Against Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 1," Levine's Working Paper Archive 234936000000000028, David K. Levine.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:89:y:2005:i:1:p:120-126. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.