Patent Protection with Licensing
This note gives a short proof that both fixed-fee and royalty licensing under patent protection can always create higher R&D investment.
|Date of creation:||19 Dec 2009|
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Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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- Wang, X. Henry, 1998. "Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-62, July.
- Rockett, Katharine, 1990. "The quality of licensed technology," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 559-574, December.
- Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2005.
"Patents and R&D: The tournament effect,"
Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 120-126, October.
- Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2005. "Patents and R & D: The tournament effect," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 05-05, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
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