Patent Protection with a Cooperative R&D Option
Patent protection may decrease R&D incentives due to the tournament e ffect. In this paper, we show that patent protection in the presence of a cooperative R&D option always increases the R&D incentive. In addition, this option dominates imitation to increase the R&D incentive under patent protection, and may also dominate royalty licensing depending on the R&D cost.
|Date of creation:||01 Apr 2012|
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- Rockett, Katharine, 1990. "The quality of licensed technology," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 559-574, December.
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