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Industry profit-maximizing joint-venture structure in a linear cournot oligopoly

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  • Yi, Sang-Seung

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  • Yi, Sang-Seung, 1998. "Industry profit-maximizing joint-venture structure in a linear cournot oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 361-366, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:58:y:1998:i:3:p:361-366
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Francis Bloch, 1995. "Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 537-556, Autumn.
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